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I. INTRODUCTION

Inflation has been a chronic socio-economic problem in several Latin
American countries ever since World War II. Were a prize given for the
dubious distinction of achieving the highest rates of inflation in the world, the
leading contenders would almost always be the countries of the southern cone
of South America. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study of 53 countries for which price level data were available between 1949 and 1965 placed
six countries in a class by themselves, far surpassing the inflation rates of all
the other countries. 1 One of the six was Korea, which had been a battleground
during much of the period under study. The other five countries - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay - had no war to blame for their
high rates of inflation. In 1957-1958 Bolivia managed to squeeze the genie of
inflation back into the bottle via a brutal stabilization program, 2 but the other
four Latin American countries have been unable to replicate that feat. During
the 1960-1965 period they managed to achieve the highest inflation rates of all
the countries in the IMF study. In first place during this period was Brazil
with an annual average inflation rate of 58 percent, followed by Uruguay with
3
32 percent, Chile with 25 percent, and Argentina with 24 percent.

*Copyright 1979 Keith S. Rosenn.
*Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1. Adekunle, Rates of Inflation in Industrial, Other Developed, and Less Developed Countries,
1949-1965, 15 I.M.F. STAFF PAPERS 531 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Adekunle].
2. For an insider's account of this stabilization program, see G. EDER. INFLATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: A CASE HISTORY OF INFLATION AND STABILIZATION IN
BoLIvIA (1968).

3. Adekunle, supra note 1, at 536.
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During the 1970s the pace of inflation has accelerated sharply in Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay. In the 1971-1977 period Chile had an annual average inflation rate of 286.4 percent, by far the world's highest. Argentina was second
with an annual average of 174.5 percent, followed by Uruguay with an annual
average of 74 percent, and Brazil with an annual average of 28.6 percent.
(Ominously, Colombia and Peru, with annual average inflation rates of 22.4
4
percent. and 21.5 percent, respectively, were not far behind.)
The U.S. reader can obtain a greater sense of perspective by considering
the effect these sustained high rates of inflation have had on indexed wages
and exchange rates. If a worker earning $1,000 a month in 1971 had his salary
indexed to the Chilean consumer price index, in 1977 he would have been
earning $551,872 a month. One new Chilean peso was worth U.S. $62.50 in
1971; as of mid-January 1979 there were 34.1 pesos to one U.S. dollar. The
dollar exchange rate for the Argentine peso was U.S. $1 =5 pesos in 1971; in
mid-January 1979 it stood at U.S. $1 = 1028 pesos. Moreover, the dollar has
itself depreciated considerably in the world's currency marts. If one uses the
International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right (SDR)l as a basis of
comparison, the rate of devaluation is even more striking. There were 5.43
Argentine pesos to a SDR in 1971; on January 25, 1979 there were 1350, an
6
increase of nearly 250 times.
There are three unique factors about the inflationary processes in these
Latin American countries. First, these inflations are chronic. They have been
going on steadily for more than thirty years in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,

and for more than twenty years in Uruguay. 7 Second, these inflations have
never degenerated into runaway or hyperinflation, such as Germany, Austria,
Hungary, Poland, and Russia experienced in the post-World War I period. s
Instead, as can be seen from Table I, these Latin American inflations have
alternated between cantering and galloping levels of intensity, with an occasional trot during the peak of a stabilization program. Third, these Latin
American inflations are not attributable to any of the usual causes of severe inflation: external war, foreign occupations, or revolution. Coups d'1tat have

4. These inflation rates are calculated from price data appearing in INT'L MONETARY FUND,
31 INrL FINANCIAL STATISTICS No. 9 (Sept. 1978) and 29 INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS No. 11

(Nov. 1976).
5. The SRD is a kind of paper gold, created as a new reserve asset by the International
Monetary Fund in 1969. Its unit value was orginally pegged to the gold value of the U.S. dollar.
In the wake of the 1971 decision by the United States to allow its currency to float and to end official convertibility of dollars for gold, the value of the SDR is determined daily by reference to a
weighted average of the currencies of 16 member nations with more than one percent of the
world's exports of goods and services during a five-year period. INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL
REPORT 56-57 (1978).
6. 8 I.M.F. SURVEY 45 (No. 3, Feb. 5, 1979).
7. See F. PAZOS. CHRONIC INFLATION IN LATIN AMERICA 13-16 (1972).

8. Id. at 18-19.
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TABLE 19

Average Annual Percentage Increases in Consumer Price Indexes of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, 1949-1977
Year

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Uruguay

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

31
26
37
39
4
4
12
13
25
32
114
27
14
26
26
22
29
32
29
16
8
14
35
59
61
23
183
543
176

5
9
12
17
14
22
23
21
16
15
39
29
33
52
70
92
66
41
31
22
22
23
20
16
13
28
29
42
44

19
15
22
22
26
56
76
66
29
26
39
12
8
14
44
46
29
23
18
27
31
33
19
100
338
503
374
312
92

5
-5
12
17
5
5
8
7
15
18
40
39
23
11
21
43
57
74
89
125
21
16
24
78
97
77
81
51
58

been triggered, at least in part, by a regime's apparent inability to control inflation, but seldom has inflation been triggered by revolutions. 10
The causes of these inflations are complex and much mooted. Space limita9. The statistics in this Table are derived from ia. at 14 for the period through 1970, and INT'L
MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STATISTICS (Nov. 1976) and INT'L MONETARY
FUND, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STATISTICS (Sept. 1978) for the period 1970-1977.

10. The inability to control spiralling inflations was one of the key factors inducing the
military to topple Goulart in Brazil in 1964, Allende in Chile in 1973, and Peron in Argentina in
1976.
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tions preclude their exploration here.11 Suffice it to say that few policymakers
in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay entertain any serious notions about
completely eliminating inflation in their respecitve countries. Most would be

quite content to reduce the inflation rate to so-called "normal" levels - ap12
proximately 10 to 15 percent a year.
Legal systems depend on money to perform three essential functions.
Money serves as: (1) a means ofpayment, facilitating the exchange of goods and
services; (2) a store of value, facilitating savings and deferred payment of obligations; and (3) a measure of value, permitting a common method of determining
the economic worth of goods and services. 13 After decades of severe inflation
the currencies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay no longer function
either as measures or stores of value. Living with inflation has forced the legal
systems of these countries to develop alternative methods for performing these
vital functions.

Inflation affects legal systems in myriad ways. Taxation, rents, mortgages,
insurance, pensions, corporate balance sheets, public utility rates, and
damage awards are among the legal institutions most seriously distorted by inflation. Rather than attempt to discuss all of these areas, this article will focus
on the law of obligations, a topic which lies at the heart of any civil law system
and encompasses both torts and contracts.
This is a particularly appropriate time to study the effects of inflation on
Latin American legal institutions. Inflation is all too vividly our own problem.
Legal institutions in the United States are experiencing currently many of the
same distortions as those in South American countries. Because of the much
greater intensity and duration of the South American inflationary experience,
these distortions are amplified many times. Moreover, the magnitude of the
inflationary experience has forced South American legislators and courts to
confront the legal distortions generated by inflation and to devise imaginative

solutions to prevent the breakdown of legal structures. There is much we in
the United States can learn from studying this aspect of Latin American law.
II.

THE RISE OF VALORISM AND THE EROSION OF NOMINALISM

During most of recorded history, the doctrine of metallism has dominated
legal perceptions about the value of money. Metallism equates the value of

money with the value of a determined weight and fineness of precious metal,
generally gold or silver. So long as money consisted of chunks of precious
metals, metallism presented few legal problems. But with the advent of
11. See generally S. WACHTER, LATIN AMERICAN INFLATION: THE STRUCTURALISTMONETARIST DEBATE (1976); Baer, The Inflation Controversy in LatinAmerica:A Survey, 2 LATIN AM.
RESEARCH REV. 3 (1967).
12. See, e.g., S. ROBOCK, BRAZIL: A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS 127 (1975).
13. Doucet, Le Franc du 8 Mars 1803 au Decembri 1958, in INFLUENCE DE LA DI!PRICIATION
MONtTAIRE SUR LA VIEJURiDIQUE PRIVtE 1, 3-4 (P. Durand ed. 1961).
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coinage, an activity soon monopolized by sovereigns for prestige and profit,
legal theory had to confront problems presented by widespread debasement
and alteration in the value of coins. If a debtor had agreed to repay ten gold
ducats (of unspecified gold content), and between the date of the loan and the
date of repayment, the sovereign reduced the gold content of the ducat by 50
percent, was the debtor obligated to repay ten or twenty ducats?
During the Middle Ages it was generally agreed that the debtor was required to repay the quantity of gold borrowed rather than the number of
monetary units. This conclusion was derived partly from Roman law, which,
as interpreted by the Glossators and post-Glossators, regarded the metallic
content of money as the sum and substance of pecuniary obligations.1 4 It also
was derived in part from a sense of natural justice. Since canon law forbade
the charging of interest, it was deemed only just to protect the creditor against
any loss for monetary depreciation.5
This view was seriously challenged in 1546 by the enormously influential
French jurist, Charles Dumoulin (Molinaeus), in his treatise Tracwaus Contracluum et Usurarum. In his treatment of usury, Dumoulin discredited the
Canonists' metallistic interpretation of Roman law and vigorously criticized
the view that money is a commodity whose value is determined by its metallic
content. Laying the doctrinal support for nominalism, Dumoulin contended
that the only value of money for juridical purposes is the value imposed by the
sovereign.1 6 Dumoulin's arguments struck a responsive chord with the French
monarchy, which was seeking to consolidate royal power at the expense of
feudal princes and the church. Within five years of the appearance of
Dumoulin's treatise, the French king issued a decree requiring all contracts to
specify pecuniary amounts by the nominal value of coins instead of metallic
weights.".
During the 16th and 17th centuries there were bitter doctrinal disputes between adherents of nominalism and metallism. The former urged that for the
purpose of discharging legal obligations, the value of money should be its face
or nominal value, which should be irrebutably presumed constant. The latter
urged that legal obligations should be discharged only upon payment of a sum
which corresponded to the intrinsic metallic value of the sum at the time the
obligation had been incurred. Nominalism is far more convenient than
metallism, for it avoids the difficult task of inquiring into the relative values of
goods and services over time. This advantage made nominalism more useful

14. F. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPEcTOF MONEY 79 (3d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as F. MANN].
15. A. NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 176 (rev'd ed. 1950)

[hereinafter cited as A. NUSSBAUM].
16. Id. at 177; F. MANN, supra note 14, at 177; A.
(2d ed. 1959).
17. F. MANN, supra note 14, at 79-80.

WALD, A CLAusULA DE ESCALA M6VEL
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to the development of modem capitalism. This greater utility, coupled with
royal sponsorship, ultimately led to widespread acceptance of nominalism during the 17th and 18th centuries. 18
The orientation of one of the world's most highly influential legal
documents, the Napoleonic Code, is decidedly nominalistic. This orientation
is most explicitly embodied in Article 1895, which provides:
The obligation which results from a loan of money is always only the
numerical sum stated in the contract. If the value of money has increased or decreased before the time of payment, the debtor must
repay only the numerical sum lent in the lawful currency at the time
of payment. 19
Latin American codifiers were heavily influenced by the Napoleonic Code,
and similar provisions were incorporated into most of Latin American civil
codes. 20 Although stated only in terms of loans, the nominalist principle gener21
ally has been applied to all obligations to pay sums of money.
Nominalism presupposes a reasonably stable currency. 22 During severe inflation, when currencies cease to function in an economic sense either as a
measure or store of value, there is often a juridical reaction against the
rigidities of the nominalist principle. Prior to the 20th century, judicial reactions against nominalism were essentially based on a metallistic concept of the
value of money. 23 During the highly inflationary post-World War I period,
18. T. ASCARELLI, PROBLEMS DAS SOCIEDADES AN6NIMAS E DIREITO COMPARADO 194 (1945).
19. CoDE NAPOLEON art. 1895 (translated by the author).
20. E.g., C6DIGOCIVILart. 619 (Argen.); C6DIoO CIVILart. 2199 (Chile); Ct5DIGOCIVILart.
2389 (Mex.); C6DIGO CIVIL art. 2199 (Uruguay); C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1737 (Venez.).
21. F. MANN, supra note 14, at 80-81.

22. As Professor Mann has observed:
Nominalism primarily applies to fluctuations in the value of money, which are slow,
gradual, and moderate. There is no certainty how English law would react in the
unlikely event of the pound sterling depreciating in so violent, sudden, and extreme a
manner as to lead to a collapse of the monetary system. Experience proves that in such a
contingency nominalism cannot, in practice, be maintained and that the legislator or,
failing him, the judge must afford relief.
Id. at 92.
Perhaps nowhere is the presupposition of monetary stability more clearly articulated than in
the note of Velez Sirsfield, the principal draftsman of the Argentine Civil Code, to Article 619,
which embodies the nominalist principle. Velez wrote:

We abstain from projecting laws to settle the much debated question regarding the
obligation of the debtor when there has been alteration in the currency, because that
alteration would have to be ordered by the national legislative body, an almost impossi-

If the intrinsic value of money is altered - says the Code of
ble occurrence ....
Austria - the person who received it must reimburse the full value that it had at the
time of the loan. If one had to promulgate a law, supposing the alteration of currencies,
we would accept the article of the Austrian Code.
CODIGO CIVIL art. 619 note (Argen.) (translated by the author).
23. For example, American courts utilized the gold value of Confederate currency to
revalorize contracts which had become worthless after the Civil War. Dawson & Cooper, The Effect of In'lation on Private Coniracts: The United States, 1861-1879, 33 MICH. L. REV. 706 (1934)
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particularly in Europe, a group of jurists and economists reacted against the
injustice resulting from adherence to the nominalist principle by urging that
the legal value of money be ascertained by reference to its purchasing power
rather than its intrinsic metallic value. These modem heirs of the metallists
' 24
have been dubbed "valorists.
The basic tenet of valorism is that pecuniary obligations should be discharged only upon payment of a sum which corresponds to the real economic
value of the obligation owed. The real economic value of money is its purchasing power rather than the number of units of gold or silver for which it can be
exchanged. By the end of World War I a number of countries were publishing
weighted price indexes on a regular basis. 21 It was to these indexes that the
valorists turned to measure the value of money. Quite correctly, the valorists
perceived that the best measure of money's purchasing power is a general
price index, such as the consumer or wholesale price index.
The valorists were particularly influential during the 1920s in Germany,
which was the only country in which the judiciary initiated and dominated an
attempt to revise contractual obligations along largely valoristic lines. 26 But
once the mark had been restabilized, Germany reverted to nominalism. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, jurists ceased to be concerned with
problems of inflation and the influence of valorism waned.
In the past two decades there has been a renascence of valorism in the
southern cone of South America. In order to permit their legal systems to
continue to function with such continuously high rates of inflation, jurists and
legislatures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have resorted to indexation, or monetary correction as it is frequently called, to readjust a great variety of legal transactions. In these countries wages, back pay awards, interest
payments, condemnation awards, rents, mortgages, bonds, corporate balance
sheets, loans, social security payments, and the income tax system are adjusted periodically in accordance with coefficients derived from the price indexes. 27 This does not mean that the legal systems of these countries have jet-

[hereinafter cited as Dawson & Cooper]. The story of legislative efforts in the United States and
France to revalorize worthless currency by reference to specie standards is told in E.
HARGREAVES, RESTORING CURRENCY STANDARDS (1926) [hereinafter cited as E. HARGREAVES].
24. E. HIRSCHBERG, THE NOMINAusrIC PRINCIPLE 74-75 (1971).
25. A. NUSSBAUM,supra note 15, at 28-29; G. WARREN& F. PEARSON, PRICES 18-23 (rev'd ed.
1933); Walsh, Index Numbers, 7-8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 652-54 (rev'd ed.

1937).
26. A. NUSSBAUM, supra note 15, at 215. See generallv Dawson, Effects of Inflation on PrioateContracts: Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Dawson].
27. Discussion of all of these types of monetary correction is beyond the scope of this article. A
much more complete discussion, albeit not specifically focused upon these four Latin American
countries, appears in K. ROSENN, LAWAND INFLATION (forthcoming). For Argeatina, see L. GuRFINKEL DE WENDY, DEPRECIACION MONETARIA: REVALUACION DE DEUDAS DINERARIAS (1977)
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tisoned nominalism and embraced valorism as a general principle. Technically, nominalism is still the general rule. Indexation generally applies only if
the parties to a contract have so stipulated or there is a specific legal norm
mandating that result. Though there are still important transactions which are
not indexed, most legal transactions are structured by taking into account
changes in the price indexes.
III.

REVISION OF CONTRA=C

BADLY DISTORTED BY

UNANTICIPATED INFLATION

A sharp surge in the inflation rate places severe pressure on the legal institution of contracts. Performance of agreements entered into upon the assumption that the value of money is relatively stable creates substantial hardship
whenever unanticipated inflation vitiates that assumption. This hardship is
most apparent in contracts whose performance is spread out over a considerable period of time, such as construction contracts, mortgages, leases, insurance policies, annuities, or installment sales. In this circumstance
legislators and judges come under considerable pressure from two distinct
economic classes: promisors whose contractual obligations have become unduly burdensome because of unanticipated inflation, and long-term creditors
whose claims will be virtually wiped out if debtors are allowed to pay them off
in badly depreciated currency.
These pressures pose a serious dilemma for legislatures and courts. If they
decide to permit revalorization of certain contractual obligations, they run the
risk of undermining transactional security. They must also resolve the thorny
question of which categories of obligations should be valorized and on what
bases. Should the legislature merely attempt to lay down broad guidelines and
rely on the courts to attempt to reach equitable solutions on a case-by-case
basis? Or should the legislature set out with considerable specificity the
categories of obligors entitled to relief? Should the legislature go further and
set out what relief each category is entitled to receive?
The economic, social, and legal problems involved in any legislative or
judicial attempt to revalorize obligations are immense. First is the largely intractable problem of what standard of value to substitute for money. Prices
gyrate widely during galloping inflation, and the price indexes are a somewhat
uncertain guide to the mercurial changes in the prices of many goods and services. Prices frequently vary considerably from day to day and from region to
[hereinafter cited as L. GURFINKEL DE WENDY]; for Brazil, seeJ. CHAcEL, M. SIMONSEN, & A.
WALD, CORREVAO, MONET, RA (1970) [hereinafter cited as J. CHACEL, el al.]; for Chile, see
Gesche Miller, La Compensatiin de la DesvalorizacidnMonefaria en el Cumpliminro de las Obligaciones,

41 Revista de Derecho [Rev. Der.] 7 (Jan.-June 1974) [hereinafter cited as Gesche Miller];
Alvarez Nufiez, Las Obligacionesde Dinero enel Cddigo Civil, 41 Rev. Der. 43 (Jan.-June 1974). For
Uruguay, see D. FERRERE.LAMAISON, EL DINERO EN LA TEORIAJURIDICA (1974).
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region. Price controls and shortages exacerbate the problem, for index makers
all too often utilize official prices, even though commodities are nowhere to be
found at such prices. 28 In addition, governments have occasionally decided
that it is easier to control price indexes than to control inflation, 29 a
phenomenon which further exacerbates the reliability problem. But despite
these difficulties, coefficients derived from the price indexes are likely to be
more reliable measures of value than foreign exchange rates or gold prices.
Foreign exchange rates of Latin American countries historically have been
pegged artificially rather then freely floating, and gold prices reflect
speculative pressures and panicky flights from currency.
Second, it is extremely difficult to reconstruct the intentions of parties who
have contracted in depreciating currency. When people enter into contracts
payable in Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, or Uruguayan currency, it is only
logical to assume that one or more of the parties has assumed the risk of a certain amount of inflation. But is it reasonable to assume that one party has
assumed the risk of any rate of inflation? If the annual inflation rate had been
10 percent for the past five years, is it reasonable to charge a person who lent
money at 12 percent annual interest with all of the economic loss resulting
from a tenfold spurt in the inflation rate? Suppose the lender was limited to 12
percent by a usury statute, or suppose protective devices such as index clauses
were prohibited by law? If one does decide to revalorize contractual obligations, doing so on the assumption that the parties contemplated a stable cur28. For example, the official Chilean consumer price index was widely believed to have
understated the actual inflation rate by a considerable amount during the Allende period because

it failed to take into account the widespread black markets spawned by extensive price controls.
G. JUD, INFLATION AND THE USE OF INDEXING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 81 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as G. JUD].
29. Brazilian manipulation of the price indexes is notorious. In the first quarter of 1966 the

weight accorded to rent in Rio deJaneiro's cost-of-living index, generally regarded as the key inflation barometer in the country, was virtually halved without a new market basket survey. This
ad hoc reweighting coincided with the introduction of legislation relaxing rent controls. See

Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled Inflation: The BrazilianDelimma, 17 AM. J. COMP. L. 239,
255 n.66 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rosenn, ControlledRents]. In October of 1969, when a frost
destroyed much of the coffee crop, changes in export prices were eliminated from the wholesale
price index, which was used to readjust government bonds for inflation. J. CHACEL, et al, supra
note 27, at 310. In December of 1972, when the inflation rate appeared to be declining, the
Brazilian government's estimate of the future inflation rate was given equal weight to past inflation recorded by the wholesale price index in order to reduce the amount by which government
bonds were readjusted. Correcfo Monetaria e Realmentacffo Inflacioniria, Conjuntura Econ6mica
[Conj. Econ.], June 1976, 88, 92. This estimate of future inflation was eliminated from the index
in March of 1974, when it became apparent that the rate of inflation was increasing. In 1975 the
government decided to purge the wholesale price index of "inflationary accidents," characterized as seasonal fluctuations, droughts, frosts, and oil import. See Rosenn, Adjusting Taxation of
Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from Brazil and Chile, 13 TEX. INT'L L. J. 165, 192 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenn]. A recently revealed classified Brazilian government study and a
World Bank study estimated the actual rise in Rio's cost of living in 1973 at 26.6 percent; the
cost-of-living index officially registered only 13.7 percent for 1973. Vidal, BrazilianLabor Federation Brings Court Action Against Government, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1977, S I, at 64, col. 3.
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rency is likely to be grossly unfair to debtors; failure to revalorize on the
assumption that the parties fairly contemplated a sharp rise in the "normal"

inflation rate is likely to be equally unfair to creditors.
Generally speaking, the legislatures of these Latin American countries have
left the question of whether to relieve parties from contracts which have
become unduly burdensome because of inflation to the courts. Unlike
American, Austrian, French, German, and Polish legislatures, all of which
enacted general legislation revalorizing specific categories of obligation expressed in badly depreciated currency, 30 these Latin American legislatures
have mandated revalorization only in a very limited number of circumstances.

Such exceptional legislation generally has been aimed at protecting the
government's own patrimony or the smooth operation of government services

rather than bailing out improvident contractors. Thus, in 1977, Argentina
enacted an extraordinary measure imposing prospective revalorization, in accordance with coefficients derived from an industrial wage index for Buenos
Aires, on all unindexed debts and mortgages contracted with the National

Housing Bank.31 One of the first indexation statutes adopted in Brazil and
Chile provided for monetary correction of delinquent tax debts to discourage

the popular practice of borrowing from the government at negative interest
rates by failing to pay one's taxes on time. 32 A similar statute was enacted by
Argentina in 1976. 3 3 In 1967 Brazil adopted legislation providing for revision
of public works contracts in accordance with a formula that relieved the firm

contracting with the government of 90 percent of the inflation experienced
34
following' submission of the bid.
30. The experiences of these countries with statutes scaling debts in collapsed currencies by
given percentages are described in E. HARGREAVES, supra note 23; Dawson & Cooper, supra note
23; Dawson, supra note 26; Picard, Le Remboursement des Dettes et la Valorisalion des Criances dans les
Pays i Monnaie Dpricie, 51 CLUNET 918 (1924).
31. Law No. 21.508 of Feb. 21, 1977 (Argen.). Debtors were afforded the option of avoiding
revalorization by paying offtheir debts with the National Mortgage Bank in full within 90 days of
the statute's effective date. Id. This statute was enacted because inflation had rendered the
Bank's receipts from interest and amortization insufficient to pay operating expenses, let alone
maintain its capital.
32. Since 1964, Brazil has subjected back taxes to monetary correction in accordance with
coefficients derived from wholesale price index. Law No. 4.357 ofJuly 16, 1964, art. 7 (Braz.).
Late penalties have also been subject to monetary correction since 1967. Decree-Law No. 326 of
May 8, 1967, art. 12, (Braz.).
Chile has required monetary correction of back tax debts since 1965. Late tax payments are
now charged interest of 1.5 percent a month, a flat 5 percent penalty, and monetary correction in
accordance with coefficients derived from the consumer price index. Rosenn, supra note 29, at
187.
33. Law No. 21.281 of April 2, 1976 (Argen.). All delinquent tax payments must be updated
by coefficients derived from the wholesale price index between the date the obligation is actually
paid and the month prior to the date the payment was due.
34. Decree-Law No. 185 of February 23, 1967 (Braz.), regulated by Decree No. 60.407 of
March 11, 1967 (Braz.). Similar legislation has been adopted by several Brazilian states. SeeJ.
CHACEL, et al, supra note 27, it 73-80.
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One exception is a unique statute adopted in 1976 by Argentina requiring
that all debts discharged under the aegis of the bankruptcy courts be monetarily corrected by coefficients from the wholesale price index for
nonagricultural products.35 Another is a sizeable group of statutes requiring
monetdry correction of specially regulated contractual obligations, such as
leases subject to rent controP 6 or collective wage agreements.
Thus, the legislatures of these countries generally left to the courts the task
of revising or abrogating contracts which have become unduly onerous
because of unanticipated inflation. The courts have intervened in this area
sparingly. Almost always, the doctrinal device utilized has been the theory of
imprevision.
A. The Theoty of Imprevision
The origins of the theory of imprevision go back to Roman law and the
medieval doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, which posits that every contract contains
a tacit clause (or implicit condition subsequent) ending or modifying its
obligatory force whenever there has been such a substantial change in the state
of facts prevailing at the date the contract was made as to render its performance unjust. This theory was espoused by the canonists of the 12th and 13th
centuries and applied by the ecclesiastical courts, who smelled usury whenever
one party's bargain seemed overly generous. It was elaborated by the postGlossators and incorporated into Italian and German doctrine until the 18th
century, when it was consigned to the doctrinal scrap heap because of its threat
to the security of commercial transactions.3 In the face of the economic disequilibria resulting; from World War I, many European' jurists sought
theoretical justifica-ions for excusing promisors from contracts whose performance had become exceedingly burdensome. They reclaimed rebus sic stantibus and recycled it under a variety of names, each with a slightly different
3

nuance.

8

35. Law No. 21.488 of December 30, 1976, arts. 1-2 (Argen.). This statute avoids the unjust
result of treating as equals creditors who have been owed the same nominal sum by the bankrupt
for varying lengths of time. It also reduced the attractiveness to debtors with substantial non-cash
assets of lightening their debts by seeking compositions or arrangements in the bankruptcy
courts.
36. E.g., Law No. 20.625 of Jan. 21, 1974 (Argen.), replaced by Law No. 21.342 ofJune 30,

1976 (Argen.); Law No. 4.494 of Nov. 25, 1964 (Braz.), as modified by Decree-Law No. 6 of Apr.
14, 1966 (Braz.); Law No. 5.334 of Oct. 12, 1967 (Braz.); Law No. 6.146 of Nov. 29, 1974

(Braz.); and Law No. 6.423 ofJune 17, 1977 (Braz.); Law No. 17.600 ofJan. 17, 1972 (Chile);
Law No. 13.292 of Oct. 1964 (Uruguay); and Law No. 14.219 ofJuly 4, 1974 (Uruguay). The
Brazilian experience in indexing rent control statutes is analyzed in Rosenn, Controlled Rents, supra
note 29.
37. See 6 M. PLAINOL & G. RIPERT, TRIATA PRATiQUE DE DRorr CIVIL FRANAIs 526-27 (2d
ed. P. Esmein 1952) [hereinafter cited as PLAINOL & RIPERT]; A. MEDEiRos DA FONSECA,'CASO
FoRTUrrOETEoRIA DA IMPREvIsAo 198-200 (3d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as A. MADEIROS DA
FONSECA].

38. French, Italian, and Polish law have developed the theorie de l'imprvision. German and
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There is no single definition of the theory of imprevision, but its core concept is that a court may annul or revise a contract whenever there has been a
substantial and unforeseen change in the economic conditions prevailing at
the time the contract was made, rendering performance by the obligor
exceedingly onerous, though not objectively impossible. 39 The doctrine tentatively crept into Brazilian law through doctrine and judicial decisions in the
1930s to permit escape from contractual obligations which had become unduly
burdensome because of deflation and the economic dislocation associated with
the Great Depression. 40 During the 1940s, when construction prices soared
because of wartime shortages and inflation, a number of Brazilian courts permitted revision or termination of unduly burdensome contracts, 41 despite the
explicit language of Article 1246 of the Civil Code apparently prohibiting such
relief.42 But since the 1950s Brazilian case law has tended to accept the doctrine of imprevision in theory but deny its application to contracts which have
become unduly onerous because of unanticipated inflation.43 After so many
years of chronic inflation, the Brazilian courts have developed a deaf ear to the

Swiss law have developed the doctrines of Geschaftsgrnndlage, economic ruin, equivalence of performance, and good faith. The Scandinavian countries expanded the concept of physical impossibility to include economic impossibility. See generally A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA, supra note
37; Smit, Frustrationof Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 287
(1958); Rodhe, Adjustment of Contractson Account of Changed Conditions, 3 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L.
151 (1959).
39. See A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA.supra note 37, at 200-45. A. CouSTASSE DELC. & F. ITURRA
A., EL CAsb FORTUITO ANTE EL DERECHO CIVIL 120-21 (1958).
40. The first Brazilian case to apply the theory of imprevision was Carlos Conteville &Cia. v.
Maison F. Elio & Cia.; S.A., 100 Revista de Direito [Rev. Dir.] 178 (1930), aff'd, 77 Revista
Forense [Rev. For.] 79 (Sup. Fed. Trib. 1938). Seegeneralbi A. MEDEIROS DA FONSECA, supra note
37, at 310-20.
41. E.g., Santos Filho & Cia. v. Rodrigues Taveres, 151 Revista dos Tribunais [Rev. Trib.]
712, 68 ArchivoJudiciirio [Arch.Jud.] 344 (5th Cam Civ. Fed. Dis. 1943); Durante v. Teixeira,
166 Rev. Trib. 786, 104 Rev. For. 269 (3d Cam Civ. Ct. App. Fed. Dis. 1945). But see Processo
M.T.I.C.N. 231.800-44, 2 Revista de Direito Administrativo [Rev. Dir. Admin.] 812 (Fasc. II
1945).
42. Article 1246 provides:
The architect or builder who contracts to build in accordance with plans accepted by the
owner, shall not have the right to demand an increment in the price, even if salaries or
materials become more expensive, or there has been an alteration or increase in the
amount of work specified in the plans, unless such increment or alteration is done in accordance with written instructions from the owner and exhibited by the architect or
builder.
C6DIGO CIVIL art. 1246 (Braz.) (translation by the author).
43. Constructor Imobliria Comercial S.A. v. Orlando Fran;a et al.,
36 Revista Trimestral de
Jurisprud~ncia [R.T.J.] 104 (3d Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); Beckhauser, et ux v. Pascoa Ceccato, 35 R.T.J. 597 (1st Sup. Fed. Trib. 1965); ECAL v. Aratijo Pereira, 4 Revista de
Jurisprudincia do Tribunal de Justiqa do Estado de Guanabara [Rev. Juris. Guan.] 208 (5th
Cam. Civ., No. 10, 1964); Banco Asnericano de Crdito S.A. v. Espdlio de Pinto de Macedo, 5
Rev. Juris. Guan. 183 (3d Group Cam. Civ., No. 13, 1965); Auerback v. Coelho Pinto, 210
Rev. For. 145 (5th Cam. Civ. Guan. 1961); Lustman v. da Costa Barros, 41 R.T.J. 725 (Ist
Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1967):
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claim that inflation was unforeseeable. Only in the area of public construction
contracts have the Brazilian courts continued to revise contracts on the theory
of imprevision,4 returning to the French administrative law origins of the
doctrine.4 5 But the enactment of federal and state legislation automatically indexing public works contracts has largely obviated any need for judicial revi46
sion in this area.
Early attempts during the 1920s and 1930s to persuade the Argentine courts
to accept the theory of imprevision were firmly rebuffed as lacking any support
in positive law.47 However, after the inflation rate exceeded 30 percent for
three consecutive years, as occurred in 1950-1952, Argentine courts began
bailing out improvident contractors by reading the theory of imprevision into
Argentine law. 48 This interpretational venture derived wide support from the
doctrine. 4 9 When the Argentine Civil Code was reformed in 1968, Article
1198 was amended to include the following provision, taken from Article 1467
of the Italian Civil Code:
If, in... contracts with deferred or continued performance, the
performance of one of the parties becomes excessively onerous
because of extraordinary and unforeseeable events, the prejudiced
party may demand the termination of the contract. The same principle shall apply to aleatory contracts when excessive onerousness
results from causes extraneous to the very risk of a contract.
In contracts of continued performance termination shall not affect
that which has already been performed.
Termination shall not be granted if the prejudiced party has been
at fault or in delay.
The other party may prevent termination by offering to improve
the effects of the contract in an equitable fashion. 0
44. E.g., Prefeitura Municipal de Santos v. Daniel Domingos & Irmaos, Ltda., 41 R.T.J. 709

(3d Term Sup. Fed. Trib. 1966).
45. The theory of imprevision in France developed in administrative law and has been confined to three types of contracts: (1) public works; (2) governmental supplies; and (3) public utility concessions. A. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 712 (1st ed. 1957). Attempts to expand the doctrine to contracts governed by the civil law have been regularly frustrated by the
Cour de Cassation. 6 PLAINOL & RiFERT, supra note 37, at 532-33; Noirel, L'Influence de la
Dpridation Monitaire dans les Contracts de Droit Privi in INFLUENCE DE LA D9PRICIATION
MON9TAIRE SUR LA VIEJURMIQUE PRIV-E 100-01 (P. Durand ed. 1961).

46. See note 34 supra.
47. Ponzano v. Banco El Hogar Argentino, 29 Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] 576 (App.
Rosario 1929); Piran de Flores v. Dose y Cia., 9 RevistaJuridica Argentina - La Ley [La Ley]
576 (1st Cam. Civ. B.A. 1937).
48. Grau Bassas v. Fernindez, 1952-IV J.A. 381 (2d Cam. Civ. y Com. Eva Per6n 1952);
Cabal v. Madero, 75 La Ley 254 (CN Civ., sala C 1953). Butsee Staudt y Cia. v. Padua, 1953-IN
J.A. 30 (App. Parana 1953), criticized in a note by Spota, but aff'd, 75 La Ley 411 (Sup. Ct.
1954). For subsequent cases accepting imprevision in the early 1960s, see cases cited at I G. BORDA, OBLIGACIONES 136 n.312 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as G. BORDA].
49. The authors are collected in I G. BoRDA, supra note 48, at 137 n.313.
50. Law 17.711 of April 22, 1968 (Argen.).
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Even though the theory of imprevision has been enacted into positive law, in
recent years Argentine courts, like their Brazilian counterparts, have been
reluctant to utilize this doctrine to relieve contracting parties, taking the position that inflation is a notorious fact of life in Argentina. 51 But the sharp upward surge in the inflation rate between 1974, when the consumer price index
rose by only 24.2 percent, and 1975 and 1976, when the index soared by 182.7
percent and 444.3 percent respectively, has led to occasional decisions reliev52
ing an obligor because of the imprevisibility of that much inflation.
Despite the high rates of inflation in Chile and Uruguay, the theory of imprevision does not appear to have been accepted by the courts or legislators.5 3
There are good reasons for judicial reluctance to embrace the theory of imprevision. At the heart of this doctrine is the notion of unforeseeability. But in
countries like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, inflation is hardly unforeseeable. What is unforeseeable is monetary stability! Thus, the nature of
the judicial inquiry really becomes whether the rate of inflation actually experienced substantially exceeded the range of inflation which reasonably
might have been contemplated by the parties. This kind of inquiry is doubly
difficult because, as Professor Alan Schwartz has astutely observed:
The price reflects the aggregate expectations of market participants, but the litigating parties may have different subjective
views as to the expected fluctuation range. This may not be unusual
in markets where speculation is frequent, as people apparently
speculate because they hold unrepresentative beliefs as to future
prices ....
Thus, a court may sometimes have to find two expected
price fluctuation curves, not one. 54
Changes in the prices of commodities and services are typical business risks.
A primary purpose of contract law is to permit the parties to fix that risk.
There is really no feasible way for the courts to differentiate between price
changes resulting from fluctuations in the value of goods and services and
those resulting from changes in the value of money, which depends on the
quantities of goods and services which one can purchase with it. To revise contracts on the theory of imprevision in a highly inflationary economy a court
must make such complex economic judgments that the outcome becomes quite

51. Tomelleri v. Murda (Cnac. Civ. 11/15/77), J.A., July 5, 1978, at 22; Erifa, S.C.A. v.
Waterling, S.R.L. (Cam. Esp. Civ. y Corn., sala 5, 6/30/78), La Ley, Sept. 20, 1978, at 5;
Chisari, Santos R. v. Vacani, Armando y otros, 1976-IIJ.A. 3 (Cnac. Civ., sala D, 1975).
52. Aycor S.A. v. Parrone, Atilio y otra, 1977-111 J.A. 618 (Cnac. Civ., sala C, 1977) and
cases cited in Bianchi, Sobre Influan e Imprevisidn, 1977-IIIJ.A. 619, 620 n.3.
53. Sebastiin Bidegiin Sachetti v. Instituto Nacional de Viviendas Econdmicas, 73 La
Justicia Uruguaya [Just. Urug.] 8410 (Trib. Apel. Civ. 1st Sess. 1975) (denying the applicability
of imprevision in Uruguayan law). Research has disclosed no Chilean cases accepting the doctrine of imprevision.

54. Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 n.30 (1976).
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unpredictable. The resulting uncertainty makes economic planning difficult,
promotes litigation and seriously undermines the public interest in the security
of transactions.
Moreover, to the extent that the courts are willing to intercede readily to
relieve contracting parties of hardship created by unanticipated inflation, the
parties are relieved of pressure to allocate the risk of inflation on their own. It
is far preferable for the parties specifically to allocate the risk of inflation than
for the courts at some later date to guess about how the parties would have
allocated the risk. As a practical matter, what has happened in these Latin
American countries is that almost everyone contracting for future performance either includes some form of protective clause or allocates the inflation
risk through the price or the interest rate. This development is described
below.
B. The Growth of Consensual Indexation
Over the years lawyers have developed a variety of techniques for protecting
the economic value of contracts from inflation. These techniques range in
sophistication from simply avoiding contracts which call for future performance for a fixed price to automatic index adjustments with complex
mathematical formulae. Though ultimately all stabilization clauses can be
regarded as commodity clauses, in that they tie the underlying value of an
obligation to the price of a single commodity or a group of commodities, for
analytical purposes it is helpful to distinguish among four basic types of
stabilization clauses: (1) commodity clauses; (2) gold clauses; (3) foreign
money clauses; and (4) index clauses.
1. Commodity Clauses
The simplest technique for insulating an agreement from the operation of
the nominalist principle is to use a commodity as both a measure of value and
a means of payment. For example, a landowner may rent a field to a farmer in
exchange for one-half the crop or for a determined amount of wheat.
Pure commodity clauses have been upheld universally. They are, however,
only crude maintenance-of-value devices, for the price of any given commodity may be subject to volatile fluctuations which have nothing to do with the inflation rate. Moreover, contracting parties ordinarily do not wish to be paid in
a particular commodity.
Since most people prefer the convenience of being paid in money, the commodity-index clause, a variant on the pure commodity clause, has evolved.
The commodity-index clause uses the price of a commodity or group of commodities only as a measure of value; currency is the means of payment. For
example, in 1953 Chile authorized the Banco del Estado de Chile to issue
readjustable bonds paying up to 6 2 percent annual interest with principal in-
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dexed to the price of wheat or concrete. 55 But with the exception of one issue,
authorized in 1956 to finance a potable water project and indexed to the price
of wheat, this type of bond has not been used. 56 The difficulty with
commodity-indexed bonds is that the purchaser must bear the risk that the
price of the commodity to which his bond is linked will lag behind the general
price level. The risk is significantly exacerbated in countries like Chile, where
price controls have been as familiar a sight on the economic landscape as infla57

tion itself.

Commodity-index stabilization clauses present legal problems similar to index clauses. These problems will be taken up infra in the section dealing with
index clauses.
2. Gold Clauses
Since people historically have regarded the value of money as the amount of
precious metal for which it could be exchanged or which it contained, the most
common form of stabilization clause until the 1930s was the gold clause. There
are several varieties of gold clauses, but their ultimate purpose are the same: to
assure the creditor that he would be no poorer in terms of gold at the time of
payment because of any decline in the purchasing power of money.
Since the enactment of legislation making nonconvertible paper money
legal tender, gold clauses have been regarded with considerable hostility by
courts in many countries. Particularly influential have been French doctrine
and case law holding that gold clauses are implicitly invalidated by the principles of nominalism and cours forci (domestically nonconvertible legal
tender). 58 The issue was hotly debated for many years in Argentina, and a
number of cases, including a decision of the Supreme Court, declared gold
clauses unenforceable because of legal tender legislation. 59 But the more recent
cases and doctrine have rejected the French approach, and it now seems
reasonably clear that gold clauses are permissible in Argentina.6" Uruguayan
cases and doctrine long maintained that gold clauses were barred by the implication of Law 5150 of August 1914, which expressly prohibits all payments in
gold. 61 This line of cases was expressly overturned by a 1976 statute which

55.
56.
[Rev.
57.
58.
59.

Chilean D.F.L. No. 357 ofJuly 25, 1953.
Moreno, Sistmas Legales d Reajustes en los ValoresMonetarios,Revista de Derecho Econdmico
Der. Econ.]Jan.-Mar./April-June 1964, at 57, 64.
See Furnish, ChileanAntitrat Law, 19 AM.J. COMP. L. 464 (1971).
A. NUSSAUM. supra note 15, at 263-66; F. MANN, supra note 14, at 151-53.
Bustillo v. Cafr Paulista, 1953-IIIJ.A. 89, 70 La Ley 399 (Sup. Ct. 1953); see also L. GuRFINKEL DE WENDY, supra note 27, at 164-71.

60. Bentivoglio v. Arana de Jordin, L.I., 1967-VI J.A. 528, 129 La Ley 799 (Sup. Ct. B.A.
1967); Gaustavino, El Derecio Civil ante la Infladon, 116 La Ley 1080, 1093-94 (1964).
61. D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, supra note 27, at 77-79; 1 J. GAMARRA, TRATADO DE DERECHO
CIVIL URUGUAYO 159 (2d ed. 1969).
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provides, in pertinent part: "The parties can establish whatever type of
stipulation for the purpose of maintaining the value of their contractual obligations." 62 Though the Chilean Supreme Court twice upheld the validity of gold
clauses after 1932, when legislation making paper money nonconvertible into
gold was enacted, 6 subsequent decisions of that tribunal have declared gold
clauses unenforceable because of such legislation. 64 Following the example of
the United States, Brazil in 1933 adopted a decree abrogating all gold
clauses; 65 however, unlike the United States, 66 the Brazilians have not seen fit
to repeal this legislation.
International monetary events have made gold clauses anachronisms. Today no currency is freely convertible into gold. Any theoretical linkage between the world's currencies and gold was formally abolished by the Second
Amendment to the International Monetary Fund's Articles, which went into
effect in 1978.67 Except for dentists, jewelers, or industrial users of gold, it no
longer makes sense to attempt to maintain the real value of a contractual
obligation by inserting a gold clause. Even prior to demonetization, gold had
become a highly speculative commodity. Today its price fluctuates widely on
international commodity markets for reasons which often are not related directly to the real purchasing power of national currency units.
3. Foreign Currency Clauses
Another common stabilization device is the foreign currency clause. The
foreign currency, which is generally a so-called "hard currency" (relatively
stable), may serve as the unit of payment or solely as the unit of account. For
example, an Argentine lease might require payment of a monthly rent of U.S.
$1,000. Alternatively, the rental might be fixed at U.S. $1,000 per month,
payable in Argentine pesos at the official exchange rate in effect on the first
day of each month.

62. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976, art. 9 (Uruguay).
63. Mujica v. Vergara, 35 Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Ciencias Sociales y Gaceta
de los Tribunales [R.D.J.] 318 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1938); Direccidn General de Impuestos Internos
v. Corte, 36 R.D.J. 426 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1939).
64. Compinia Chilena de Electricidad v. Ferrocarriles del Estado, 46 R.DJ. 917 (2d Part, 1st
Sec. 1949); Fisco v. Compinia de Teldfonos de Chile, 45 R.D.J. 644 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1948); see
also Varela Varela, Dicurso, in EL DERECHO ANTE LA INFLACION 25, 29 (Primer Congreso Nacional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954); Lira Urquieta, El Cddigo Civily la Infiadin, in EL DERECHO
ANTE LA INFLACi6N 152, 155 (Primer Congreso Nacional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954). Presently, gold clauses would seem to be banned by Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974, arts. 17,
19 (Chile), with respect to credit transactions, unless special permission is obtained from the Central Bank.
65. Decree No. 23.501 of Nov. 27, 1933 (Braz.)
66. Pub. L. No. 95-147, S4(c), 91 Stat. 1299 (1977), repealingthe U.S. Joint Resolution with
respect to obligations issued on or after October 28, 1977.
67. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 56 (1978).
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Argentina and Chile have permitted the use of foreign currency clauses.

The case law has insisted, however, that except for international transactions,
the foreign currency serve only as a unit of account; the unit of payment must
be national currency. 6 Until 1976 Uruguayan courts regularly nullified
foreign currency clauses in domestic contracts as incompatible with the legal
tender legislation. 69 This line of cases was legislatively overruled in 1976 by
Law No. 14.500, which expressly permits foreign currency clauses regardless
of whether the foreign currency is the unit of account or the unit of payment.70
Brazilian law, on the other hand, continues to regard as null and void all
foreign currency clauses except for: (a) import or export contracts; (b) financing agreements for the export of Brazilian goods; (c) contracts for the buying
and selling of foreign exchange; and (d) contracts where the debtor and the
creditor are neither Brazilian citizens or domiciliaries, unless the contract involves the lease of real property situated in Brazil. 7
Foreign currency clauses are useful techniques for shifting exchange risks in
international transactions, but they are far from ideal devices for protecting
parties from the risks of inflation in domestic contracts. Though the dollar
may appear to be stable to a landlord in Argentina, whose peso has declined
enormously vis-a-vis the dollar in the last six years, the purchasing power of the
dollar has itself declined by approximately 50 percent between 1971 and 1977.
The foreign currency clause offers no protection against inflation in the socalled "hard currency." Moreover, in the short-run at least, countries
undergoing severe inflation often delay devaluation or devalue by far less than
inflation fate differentials would suggest as proper." When this happens, as it
commonly does in Latin America, creditors who rely on foreign currency
68. Atlas S.A. v. Valentine, 105 La Ley 691 (CN Com., Sala C, Arg. 1961); Schwarz v.
tazar, 60 R.D.J. 169 (2d Part, 2d Sec., C. Santiago, Chile 1963).

Cor-

69. The cases are collected and criticized in Capurro Calamet, Algo Mds sobre la Pretendida
Vigencia del Curso Forzoso y el Problema de la Efaiajuridica de las ObligacionesInternas Pacladas en
Moneda Extranera, 64 Revista de Derecho, Jurisprudencia y Administracidn [Rev. D.J.A.] 1
(1967); see also Caggiani, Alconey Validez des las CliusulasMonetariasseg6n Nuestro Derecho Positivo, 64
Rev. DJ.A. 26 (1967); Quijano, La Cldusula Oro o en Moneda Extranjeraftentea la Ly del 8 de Ereno
de 1938, Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Administraci6n [Rev. Fac. Ciencias
Econ. y. Admin.] 316 (No. 2, 1940).
Foreign currency loans, however, were expressly permitted by statute for loans made through
the Central Bank with the proceeds of foreign borrowing for economic development purposes. D.
FERRERE-LAMAISON. supra note 27, at 96-100.
70. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976, art. 10 (Uruguay). However, the Uruguayan courts
have refused to apply Law No. 14.500 retroactively. E.S.A. v. A.B., 76Just. Urug. 8719 (Trib.
Appl. Civ., 1st Sess. 1977).
71. Decree Law No. 23.501 of Nov. 27, 1933 (Braz.), as amended by Law No. 28 of Feb. 15,
1935 (Braz.); Decree No. 6.650 ofJune 29, 1944 (Braz.); and Decree-Law No. 857 of Sept. 11,
1969 (Braz.).
72. See generally G. HALM, MONETARY THEORY 221-28 (1946). Brazil has frequently maintained an overvalued exchange rate. See Cline, Brazil's Emerging InternationalEconomic Role, in
BRAZIL IN THE SEVENTIES 63,'68-70 (R. Roett ed. 1976).
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clauses for protection are bound to be at least partially disappointed. Finally,
they create problems of interpretation when, as occasionally happens in Latin
America, multiple exchange rates are in effect.
4. Index Clauses
The most effective way for contracting parties to protect themselves against
inflation is by linking the value of their bargain to a broadly-based price index,
such as the consumer price index, wholesale price index, or implicit GNP
deflator. 73 Because such indexes are yardsticks of the purchasing power of national currency, they are tailored far better to inflation-proofing contracts than
commodity, gold, or foreign currency clauses. A number of courts and commentators also have voiced hostility to permitting the use of index clauses. The
legal reasons advanced for striking down index clauses generally are perceived
conflicts with legal tender legislation, the nominalist principle, or public
policy. 74 But the underlying reasons would appear to be the fear that index
clauses exacerbate inflationary pressures, impose inequitable burdens on certain debtors, and unfairly allow a few privileged persons to escape the implicit
tax levied upon society through the mechanism of inflation. 75 Despite their
present popularity in these Latin American countries, index clauses have had
to overcome a number of juridical obstacles.
Brazilians have had to contend with doctrine and case law invalidating index clauses because of the broad language used in the gold clause legislation.
Decree No. 23.501 of November 27, 1933, which is still in force, not only
abrogates all gold clauses, but goes on to nullify every contract to be performed in Brazil "that stipulates payment in money other than by its current
legal value." 7 6 This ambiguous language caused some Brazilian jurists to
declare that index clauses were forbidden unless specifically authorized by the
legislature. 77 Because of lingering doubts about the validity of index clauses,

73. Rosenn, ProtectingContractsfom Inflation, 33 Bus. LAW. 729 (1978). A brief, readable explanation of the construction and qualities of these indexes is contained in W. WALLACE,
MEASURING PRICE CHANGES: A STUDY OF THE PRICE INDEXES (2d ed. 1972).

74. The source of much of this doctrinal absurdity has been France. The literature describing
the doctrinal knots in which the French have tied themselves on this issue is immense. Useful
treatments in English are Lvy, "Sliding &ale" or "Indexation" Clauses in FrenchLaw, 16 AM. U. L.
REV. 35 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Ldvy]; Hauser, The Use of Index Clauses in PrivateLoans, 7 AM.
J. COMP. L. 350 (1958); Vasseur, French Monetay Depreciation andMethods Used to Remedy It, 30
TUL. L. REv. 73 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Vasseur].
75. See Vassuer, supra note. 74; see also, Ldvy, supra note 74, at 38-49 for a description of the
variety of legal arguments and counterarguments articulated in French doctrine and cases.
76. Se note 65 supra.
77. E.g., Caio Mario da Silva Pereira, Establecimento de CMusula de EscalaMvel nas Obrigac5esem
Dinheiro, 234 Rev. Trib. 3, 157 Rev. For. 50 (1955); San Tiago Dantas, cited in A. WALD, supra
note 16, at 160-61; Draft Code of Obligations of 1965, art. 144.
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the military government which came to power in Brazil in 1964 felt it
necessary to enact numerous statutes specifically authorizing the use of indexation in certain types of transactions and under certain conditions.7 8 Since
there has never been an across-the-board authorization of indexation in all
contracts, Brazilians long have harbored doubts about the legality of index
clauses not specifically authorized by statute. In recent years, however, the
case law has taken the position that all index clauses are valid unless they con79
flict with a specific legislative norm.
Though French doctrine and case law with respect to nominalism and cours
force initially generated some doubts, the Argentines, Chileans, and
Uruguayans long have regarded index clauses as valid and have employed
them widely.8 0
Another legal hurdle for index clauses has been usury laws. If the adjustment resulting from indexation is considered interest rather than return of
principal, index clauses in loans are likely to be deemed usurious even with
relatively mild rates of inflation. Since the nominalist principle conclusively
presumes that money is always equal to itself, courts accustomed to thinking
in nominalist terms are prone to consider sums from indexation as interest. 8'
Even in countries like Brazil and Chile, where indexation is widespread, the
courts occasionally have allowed usury statutes to trap the unwary. Though in
1966 the Chilean Supreme Court reversed the criminal conviction for usury of
a defendant who had indexed the balance due on the sale of an apartment to
the price of wheat, 8 2 in 1970 the Court of Appeals for Santiago astonishingly
upheld the usury conviction of a moneylender whose loans, which carried a
nonusurious nominal interest rate, were indexed to the official cost-of-living
index. 85 In Brazil, whether the usury laws are violated has become essentially
a matter of how one labels the transaction. So long as one is careful to use the
78. This legislation is described in J. CHACEL, et al., supra note 27; and INDEXATION, THE
BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE (M. Nadiri & A. Pastore eds., Occasional Papers of the Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Vol. 4, No. 1, Winter 1977).
79. J. CHAcEL, el aL, supra note 27, at 58-59. One example of such a norm is Law No. 5.411 of
May 24, 1968 (Braz.), restricting increments in residential rentals from index clauses to a maximum of two-thirds of the percentage increase in the minimum wage.
80. For Argentina, see F. TRiGo REPRESAS, OBLIGACIONES DE DINERO Y DEPRECIACION
MONETARA 211 (1965); for Chile, see Vargas Vargas, Notas para un Estudio de la Cldusula de
Variado'nsegn Indices en el ContratodeMutuo, in EL DEPECHo ANTE LA INFLACION 159 (Primer Congreso Nacional de Abogados Chilenos, 1954); for Uruguay, see D. FERRERE-LAMAISONsupra note
27, at 110.
81. Two recent examples in the United States are Aztec Properties v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bank, 530 S.W. 2d 756 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976); and Olwine v. Torrens,
236 Pa. Super. 51, 344 A.2d 665 (1975).

82. Salas v. Miguel, 63 R.D.J. 141 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1966). This case is discussed in Fueyo
Laneri, La Actualizadidn o Reajustabilidaddel Valor de la Deuda Dinerdria,coma Requisito del Pago Efec-

dto, CualquieraQueSea la Fuentede la Obligacidn, Rev. de Ciencias Penales 3, 11-12 (1974), translated
in K. KARST & K. RosENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 454 (1975).
83. Wagemann Ehrenfeld; Julio, 67 R.DJ. 42 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1970).
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term monetary correction or commission rather than interest to denominate
payments for the use of money, Brazilian courts are willing to tolerate the circumvention of the usury laws. 4 Indeed, it is common for lenders to
denominate sums as "prefixed monetary correction" to circumvent the usury
laws. 85 But if a lender is naive enough to call the additional sums interest, the
Brazilian courts have tended to enforce the 12 percent a year usury limitation
in purely nominalist terms. 86 Chile has obviated this usury problem by defining interest in valoristic terms. A 1974 statute specifically provides that
nominal increases in loan payments because of increases in the consumer price
index are not interest for any legal purpose.87
Though index clauses now are permitted in all four of these South American
countries, Brazil and Chile recently have imposed certain restrictions on their
use. Concern about the inflationary feedback from its comprehensive system
of monetary correction led Brazil to enact a law in 1977 which limits indexation of virtually all pecuniary obligations to the type of readjustment
calculated by the government for Readjustable Treasury Bonds. 8 Though
readjustment of these bonds is supposed to be based upon variations in the
wholesale price index, in recent years the government has expurgated and
manipulated the adjustment mechanism so that the rate of increase in these
bonds has been several percentage points below that of the wholesale price index.89 In 1974 Chile enacted a statute that is Janus-faced with respect to indexation. 9s First, it repeals Article 2199 of the Chilean Civil Code, which had explicitly adopted nominalism but had expressly permitted index clauses. 9 1Sec84. B. Prates & Cia. Ltda. v. Toyota do Brasil S.A., R.E. No. 64.473, 53 R.T.J. 21 (Sup.
Trib. Fed. en banc 1969); Wald, Da CorreCffo Monetria dos Deitos Comerciais na Jurispniiacia,
Revista dos Tribunais Informa [RT Informa], Jan. 30, 1971, at 17.
85. Rosenn, Adapdons of the BrazilianIncome Tax to Inflation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 58, 96 (1968).
The total interest and estimated monetary correction are fixed in advance, but no attempt is
made to separate interest from monetary correction until the official calculation of the Readjustable Treasury Bonds is made. At the time any amount in excess of the officially recognized
amount of monetary correction is denominated interest and the rest is considered tax-exempt and
usury-exempt monetary correction.

86. Figueiredo v. Gutierre, R.E. No. 58.414, 36 R.T.J. 46 (Sup. Fed. Trib., 1st Term, 1965);
Albino da Cruz Ferro, R.E. No. 65.424, 47 R.T.J. 558 (Sup. Fed. Trib., 1st Term 1968).
87. Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974, art. 4 (Chile).
88. Law No. 6.423 ofJune 17, 1977 (Braz.). This statute excepts only contracts for the future
delivery of goods or services and certain contracts already in force.

89. Between 1974 and 1976 the value of Readjustable Treasury Bonds increased by 30.1 percent, while the wholesale price index increased by 41.3 percent. During the first quarter of 1977
Readjustable Treasury Bonds increased by 6.1 percent, while the wholesale price increased by
13.4 percent. Calculated from data appearing in Conj. Econ., May 1977, at 153, 169. The evolution of the formula for the calculation of monetary correction for Readjustable Treasury Bonds is

shown in Correco Monetdria eRealimentaoInflacondria, Conj. Econ., June 1976, at 88, 92-94; and
CorreCfo Moneldriadas O.R. T.N.-Fornas de Cdiulo, Conj. Econ., Dec. 1974, at 92; see also note 29,
supra.

90. Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974 (Chile).
91. Id., art. 25.
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ond, it prohibits indexation of all credit transactions with a term of one year or
less, forcing the creditor to rely solely on the interest rate to protect himself
against inflation. Third, it frees interest rates from nominalist usury constraints by defining interest so as to exclude any sums resulting from indexation, at least to the extent of the variation in the official consumer price

index.9 2 Fourth, the law automatically indexes all credit transactions in
Chilean currency with a term of more than one year to the consumer price index unless the parties expressly stipulate to the contrary or secure Central

Bank permission to use an alternative index. 9 3 Fifth, it modifies the Commercial Code to permit negotiable instruments to contain index clauses. 94
Indexation has become a vital mechanism in restoring the medium and
long-term credit markets, which had largely disappeared in these countries
because of inflation. In Argentina and Brazil indexed government securities
have become very important financial instruments. 95 However, there has not
been a corresponding development in private corporate offerings of indexed
securities. 96 In all of these countries, there are extensive systems of indexed
savings deposits and correspondingly indexed mortgages.97

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that all credit transactions are indexed. Many businessmen are unhappy about not knowing what their actual
cost of credit will be in advance. In all of these countries there are large
numbers of credit transactions, generally short-term, that remain unindexed,

or employ what the Brazilians call "prefixed monetary correction. " 98
IV.

DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF OBLIGATIONS

Chronic inflation can play havoc with damages awarded by courts for
breach of contract or torts. The nominalist principle, fixed legal interest rates,
and currency depreciation - operating in tandem - can effectively thwart

92. Id., art. 4.

93. Id., art. 19.
94. Id., arts. 26, 27.
95. See G. JUD, supra note 28, at 104-07; Roe, Indexation of Qvernment Bonds in Brazil: Reflections
on the Relationship between Fixed Rules and FinancialDevelopment, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. -

(1979).
96. Ness, FinancialMarkets Innovation as a Development Strategy: Initial Resultsfrom the BrazilianExperience, 22 EcON. DEv. & CULT. CHANGE 453, 458 (1974).

97. The Brazilian system is described in Lefcoe, Monetay Correction and Mortgage Lending in
Brazil: Observationsforthe UnitedStates, 21 STAN. L. REv. 106 (1968); Reynolds & Carpenter, Hous-

ing Financein Brazil: Towards a New Distributionof Wealth, in 5LATIN AM. URB. RESEARCH 147 (W.
Cornelius & F. Trueblood eds. 1975). The Chilean program is described in Burke, Law and
Development: The Chilean Housing Program, 2 LAW. AMERICAS 173, 353 (1970); G. JUD,supra note
28, at 88-90. Though legislation authorizing readjustable savings deposits and mortgages was
enacted in Argentina during the 1960s, the system only recently has become widely used. See
Resolution No. 21 of the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Prestamno para la Vivienda of Dec. 30, 1975;
G. JUD. supra note 28, at 106-07. Uruguay has had an indexed deposit and mortgage system since
1969. See Robinson, Readjustable Mortgages in an Inflationary Economy

-

A Study of the IsraeliEx-

perience, 5J. INrT L. & EcoN. 169, 182 (1971); D. FERRERE-LAMAISON, supra note 27, at 110-13.
98. See note 85 supra.
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the basic purpose of compensation, restoration of the status quo ante to the extent monetarily possible.
Inflation erodes the value of monetary damages in several ways. Where
damages are liquidated or calculated as of the date of breach or the tort, inflation between that date and the date of judgment will substantially reduce the
value of the award, unless interest is awarded at a rate which exceeds inflation.
If there is a significant lapse of time betweenjudgment and payment, inflation
will further erode the real value of the compensation awarded. This gives the
defendant an enormous economic incentive to delay the proceedings as much
as possible. The problem of inflationary erosion is even more pronounced with
respect to damages for future injuries, such as lost earnings or profits. To the
extent that courts fix such sums in terms of present values, inflation will
quickly render the award inadequate. This is particularly striking in countries
like Brazil and Chile, which compensate tort victims for lost future earnings
with a pension instead of a lump sum award.
Consider the facts of the Chilean case of Guzmin v. Empresa de los Ferrocarriles
del Estado.99 In 1959 Sra. Guzm n attempted to secure judicial revision of her
monthly pension of 500 pesos, awarded in 1942 for life or until remarriage, to
indemnify her for the wrongful death of her husband. Her pension was based
upon her deceased husband's earnings in 1934, the date he was killed in a
train accident. By 1942, when she finally began receiving her pension, inflation already reduced its purchasing power by more than half. By 1959 her
pension had lost 99.4 percent of its 1934 value. Though he could find no legal
basis to revise this widow's pittance, the trial judge increased it anyway, citing
general considerations of equity. However, the Court of Appeals reversed on
the grounds that the judgment violated the principle of res judicata, and the
Chilean Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court of Appeals.100
A. The Award of Indexed Pensions
Brazil has resolved the inequities inherent in the Guzmn situation by
awarding indexed pensions. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, as inflation began to gallop, Brazilian courts began to index pensions in accident
cases to the prevailing minimum wage. The problem was particularly acute in
Brazil because procedural law required the indemnity for lost earning capacity
be in the form of a pension. Despite initial hostility to this innovation, after
1963 the Supreme Federal Tribunal, Brazil's highest court, began confirming
indexed awards.101 By 1969 the Supreme Federal Tribunal's decisions had

99. 60 R.D.J. 407 (2d Part, 1st Sec. 1963).

100. 60 R.DJ. at 418-19.
101. E.g., de Oliveira v. Rio Light S.A., R.E. No. 57.505, 45 R.T.J. 115 (2d Term 1967);
Silva Ramos v. Rde Ferroviiria Feder.al S.A., 45 R.T.J. 421 (lst Term 1968). The case law

'volution is traced in considerable detail inJ.

CHACEL,

e aL, supra note 27, at 188-206.
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become sufficiently uniform on the subject for the court to promulgate the
following S&mula, or case law rule: "The pension corresponding to compensation for civil responsibility must be calculated on the basis of the minimum
wage prevailing at the time of the judgment and shall be adjusted for subsequent variations. " ' 102 In most cases Brazilian courts require the tortfeasor to
purchase and deposit with the court government bonds with a yield sufficient
to fund the pension.1 0 3 The introduction of Readjustable Treasury Bonds in
1964 has made it possible for the Brazilian courts to fund indexed pensions for
10 4
accident victims with correspondingly indexed securities.
B. Debts of Value
An important doctrinal technique for shifting the onus of monetary
depreciation to the tortfeasor or one who breaches another type of obligation
has been to differentiate between debts of value (Wertschuld, divida do valor,
deuda de valor) and pecuniary debts. A debt of value, sometimes called an
adaptable debt,10 5 requires the obligor to pay an economic value rather than a
fixed pecuniary sum. Child support and alimony are classic examples: if the
needs of the child or spouse change, or the purchasing power of the currency
declines, the support obligation may be revalued. In theory one distinguishes
between debts of value and pecuniary debts by determining whether the object
of the obligation is the payment of an essentially non-pecuniary value or the
payment of a sum of money. If the obligation's object is the formeri, the debt is
one of value and, by definition, readjustable for inflation. However, there is
no conceptual conformity. The writers and cases diverge considerably, both as
to which kinds of obligations should be characterized as debts of value, and as
to whether a debt of value becomes a pecuniary debt as soon as it is liquidated
(in a sense of being valued in currency), or remains a debt of value until judgment, or actual payment. 06 The debt of value is essentially a doctrinal device

102. Sumula No. 490 of Dec. 3, 1969, publishedinDiario daJustiqa da Unifo Federal, Dec. 10,
1969, at 5.931 (translation by the author).
103. CSDGIODEPROCESSOCIVILDE 1939, arts. 911, 912 (Braz.) as amended by Decree-Law No,
4.565 of Aug. 11, 1942 (Braz.); CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL DE 1973, art. 602 (Braz.).

104. E.g., Viardo Nove dejulho Ltda. v. Cromopel-Com~rcio e Ind6stria de Papel e Papelgo
S/A, A.C. No. 169.923, 395 Rev. Trib. 183, 186 (1st Civ. Cain. S.P. 1968). Law No. 6.205 of
April 29, 1975 (Braz.), prohibits the use of the minimum wage for monetary correction "for any
legal purposes whatsoever," except for wage, social security, and fringe benefit adjustments. Adjustments for other purposes should be made on the basis of changes in the value of Readjustable
Treasury Bonds. See Law No. 6.423 ofJune 17, 1977 (Braz.).
105. The term Wertschuld was invented in 1925 by Arthur Nussbaum to differentiate between
pecuniary and value obligations. Because he felt the term "value-debt" was obscure in English,
Professor Nussbaum decided to translate Wertschuld as "adaptable debt." A. NUSSBAUM, supra
note 14, at 180 n.45. Debt of value seems clearer than adaptable debt, and the text proceeds on
that basis.
106. As Professor Gomes has so accurately stated:
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for placing the risk of monetary depreciation on the obligor when it appears
just to do so. During times of severe inflation there is a natural tendency on
the part of doctrinal writers and lawyers to attempt to expand the scope of
debts of value. Though there is little dispute among jurists who recognize the
concept that tort and contract damages are debts of value, there is little agreement as to whether such damages become pecuniary debts once liquidated.
Severe inflation and the influence of European doctrine and case law recently have led the courts of Argentina and Brazil to accept the doctrine of the
debt of value and to shift the time for calculating damages from the date of the
accident or breach of contract to the date of the judgment.10 7 The Chilean
courts also have changed their orientation in the past decade to permit
monetary correction of a damage award to compensate for monetary depreciation between the date of the accident and the date of payment of the
judgment. 108 Uruguayan lower courts and doctrinal writers have accepted the
concept of the debt of value; 10 9 however, the Supreme Court has thus far sandbagged this breach in the dam of nominalism. 110
The effect of the debt of value characterization is to place the onus of
monetary depreciation on the tortfeasor or the party in default on a contractual obligation up to the moment of actual payment. If there is monetary
depreciation between the date ofjudgment and actual payment, such as when

There is no conceptual uniformity; the notion varies according to the exigencies of the
monetary picture and ... in accordance with the criteria which the writers prefer....
[T]he preferable notion is that which characterizes [debts of value] as obligations whose
object does not originally constitute a nominal sum, but depends upon the circumstances or future elements, variable and exogenous to the juridical relationship.
However, they do not constitute a homogeneous category. Mugel has separated them
into three groups: (1) credits of reparation; (2) credits of reimbursement; and (3) credits
of unjust enrichment.
0. COMES, TRLANsFoRmAcOEs GEA.Is Do Diazrro DAs OBRIGACOES 112-13 (1967).
107. For the evolution of Argentine case law and doctrine, see E. BANCHIO. OBLIGACIONES DE
VALOR 133-38 (1965) [hereinafter cited as E. BANCH1O]; for a resumd of current Brazilian case
law, see Wald, A Inflacio eas ndeniza&s, 233 Rev. For. 21 (1971).
108. Cohen, Mario Cdsar, 66 R.D.J. 203 (2d Part, 4th Sec. 1969); Lama, Abraham, 67
R.DJ. 424 (2d Part, 4th Sec., Sup. Ct., Oct 16, 1970), Escobar, Angelica, 71 R.D.J. 278 (2d
Part, 4th Sec., Sup. Ct., Oct. 8, 1974).
109. J.A. v. C mara del Bien Raz, 67 Just. Urug. No. 7907 (Juzgado Letrado del Trabajo de
2d Turmo, Feb. 1, 1973); Galvin Freijo de Reyes v. Dominguez, 66 Just. Urug. No. 7890 (Ist
Instance, Aug. 26, 1971); E.F.M. v. B.F.S., 67 Just. Urug. No. 8036 (Ist Instance, Apr. 24,
1973); Carnelli, La Desvalorizacdn Monetaria en la Reparacdn del Daio ExFracontractual, 68 Rev.
DJ.A. 276 (1969) and cases cited therein.
110. Onda S.A.v. CUTCSA, 69Just. Urug. 8171 (Sup. Ct.,June 5, 1974). However,.to the
extent that the tort claim is liquidated, Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976 (Uruguay), now provides for readjustment in accordance with the variations in the consumer price index between the
date of the tort and the date of payment. But the Uruguayan Supreme Court has refused to apply
this statute retroactively, tenaciously adhering to nominalist theory. Ferrari, Britos et al. v.
Frigorifico Modelo S.A., 75 Just. Urug. No. 8623 (Sup. Ct., May 13, 1977).
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an appeal is taken, the amount of the obligation will be revalued to reflect the

1
interim diminution in value."

Though it has considerable utility in securing relief from the nominalist
principle during periods of inflation, the debt of value concept breaks down in
two important areas: (1) pecuniary obligations; and (2) nonliquidated
damages which are converted into pecuniary obligations by virtue of their
payment by the plaintiff. These problems are discussed in the next section.
C. Pecuniary Obligations The doctrine of the debt of value is no help to the creditor who sues for
damages arising from failure to repay a debt on time. In this situation, the
obligation is plainly pecuniary, and Civil Code provisions typically restrict the
creditor's remedy to legal interest. But legal interest, which in a country like
Brazil is set at 6 percent a year, is often decidedly negative in an inflationary
economy. Invocation of the nominalist principle prevents the creditor from
recovering for monetary depreciation, because such damage is presumed to be
nonexistent. It makes sense to impose the risk of monetary depreciation on the
creditor during the term of the loan, for it is fair to assume that he allowed for
that risk in determining the interest rate, or could have protected himself
against that risk by use of a stabilization clause. But it makes little sense to
assume that the creditor also assumed the risk of monetary depreciation
beyond the date set for repayment,112 even though it is customary for commercial lenders to factor in the risk of default.
A similar problem arises with respect to the nondefaulting party who has to
cover by purchasing goods in the open market, or the tort victim who repairs
his car prior to suing for damages. It is hard to characterize what they are
owed as nonpecuniary obligations, though some courts have stretched the
elastic of the debt of value concept to include them." 3 Application of the

nominalist principle to place the burden of monetary depreciation on these involuntary creditors makes no sense at all, for they clearly never assumed the
risk of monetary depreciation and never had a chance to protect themselves
against it. The onus appropriately belongs on the tortfeasor or the defaultor,
111. Starting from the proposition that damage awards are debts of value, Argentine doctrine
and case law, albeit less than unanimously, holds that a damage award does not lose its character
as a debt of value until the moment of payment. E. BANCHIO, supra note 107, at 129-49. In Brazil
and Chile, where the courts have been influenced by a great deal of legislation mandating
monetary correction, damage awards are being monetarily corrected in accordance with variations in price indexes or the minimum wage between the date ofjudgment and the date of actual
payment. Brazilian cases are collected in J. CHACEL, et al., supra note 27, at 176-213; Wald,
Paracer,258 Rev. For. 191, 196-202 (1977). The Chilean cases are collected in Gesche Miiller,
supra note 27.

112. Hauser, Breach of Contractsduring Inflation, 33 TUL. L. REV. 307, 308 (1959).
113. For a time, Argentine case law was badly divided on this precise question. The cases are
collected in Malvar, Deudas de Valory de Dinero. La DesvalorizacionMonetariay e Proceso, Oportundad
paraAlegarla, 1968-VIJ.A. 138-39.
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who otherwise profits from being able to pay off his obligation in depreciated
currency.
Uruguay resolved this problem by statute in 1976.114 Since the Uruguayan
Supreme Court has refused to recognize the concept of the debt of value to
readjust damages for inflation, the legislature has provided that monetary
depreciation shall be taken into account in liquidating the value of all
pecuniary obligations whose performance is the subject of a lawsuit or arbitral
proceeding. This is to be calculated by multiplying the amount of the obligation on the date it arises by the percentage increase in the consumer price index between that date and the date the obligation is actually paid. Interest also
115
is calculated on the readjusted value.
Spurred by the hyperinflation of 1975 and 1976 and a strong doctrinal current, ' 1 6 the Argentine courts recently have jettisoned nominalism on their own
and permitted recovery for monetary depreciation when there has been delay
in the payment of pecuniary obligations. 17 In reaching this result, the Argentine courts and commentators have relied on a suggestive note by Vilez
Sirsfield, the drafter of the Civil Code, that had he been contemplating
monetary depreciation (which he was not), he would have chosen the solution
of the Austrian rather than the French Civil Code. 18 Initially, some of the
commercial courts excluded overdue negotiable instruments and other commercial paper from judicially imposed indexation because of a desire to maintain the notion that the value of the instrument be ascertainable on its face.11 9

114. Law No. 14.500 of Feb. 25, 1976 (Uruguay).
115. Id., art. 4.
116. E.g., Lopez Cabana, La "Ind= in" de las Deudas Dinerarias, 1976-Ill J.A. 788;
Bustamante Alsina, Deudas de Dinero y Deudas de Valor. Alcance de la Distincion y Posibilidadde
Suprimirla, 149 La Ley 952 (1973); Dari6, Incumplimiento e wna Obligacdn DinerariayDeprecioacn
Monetaria, 29 J.A. 799 (1975); Borda, Las Deudas de Dineroy la DesvalorizaciinMonetaria, La Ley
1975-C-793; Carranza, Las Deudas Dinerariasfientea la Desvalorizaciinde la Moneda, J.A. Doctrina
186 (1974).
117. Vieytes de Fernindez v. Provincia de Buenos Aires, 1976-IV J.A. 367, La Ley
1976-D-241, (Sup. Ct., Sept. 23, 1976); Valdez v. Gobierno Nacional, La Ley 1976-D-248 (Sup.
Ct., Sept. 23, 1976); Maturana v. Elma, La Ley 1977-C-533 (CN Fed., Apr. 22, 1977); La
Amistad S.R.L. v. Iriarte, 1977-IVJ.A. 3, La Ley 1977-D-1 (CN Corn., en banc Sept. 19, 1977);
CN Corn, en banc April 13, 1977, in La Ley, Apr. 22, 1977, at 1.
118. See note 22 supra. The Austrian Code provision referred to by Velez S&sfield is Article
988 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Legal currency changes, without alteration of the internal value, are at the risk of the
creditor. He shall accept payment in the fixed sort of coin given by him, for example,
1000 imperial ducats or 3000 twenty kreuzer-pieces, without regard to whether or not
their external value has been increased or diminished in the meantime. However, if the
internal value has been altered, the payment is to be effected in proportion to the internal value which the said sort of coin had at the time the loan was contracted.
Translatedby P. BAECK, THE GENERAL CIVIL CODE OF AusTRIA 191-92 (1972).

119. Chiarmonte, LaDepreciacionMonetariaen los Thtulos de Creditoy en elProceso Ejecutivo, La Lay
1978-A-267.
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But a very recent en banc decision has abandoned this distinction and has re120
quired indexation of all unpaid pecuniary obligations.
Although the question is not free from doubt, Chile would appear also to
have rejected the nominalism of its Civil Code and to permit recovery for
21
monetary depreciation for delay in the payment of pecuniary obligations.
The Brazilian courts, on the other hand, generally have adhered to
there are very renominalism with respect to pecuniary obligations, 122 though
123
cent indications that this orientation may be changing.
V.

CONCLUSION

Chronic inflation has forced Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay to
abandon nominalism and embrace valorism in a number of crucial areas of
their legal systems. In Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, the
courts have played a leading role in adapting legal institutions to inflation to

120. Papelera Alsina S.A. v. Arnedo,Jos6A., La Ley 1978-A-267 (CN Corn, en ban, Dec. 22,
1977).
121. There have been few reported Chilean cases dealing with this problem. In Enrique Prez
Moscoso v. Pablo Vald~s Ossa, 62 R.DJ. 9 (2d Part, 3d Sec., Sup. Ct., April 2, 1965), the
Labor Court of Santiago monetarily corrected the damages owed an employee for breach of a
labor contract because the unpaid salary had an alimentary character, a result confirmed by the
Supreme Court in denying an appeal. The opposite result was reached in an unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals of Concepcidn of April 15, 1974, which relied upon the nominalist
theory of the Civil Code to reject a request for readjustment of a sum owed because of breach of a
service contract. Cited in Alvarez Nufiez, Las Obligaciones de Dinero en el Cddigo Civil, 41 Rev. Der.
43, 51 n.8 (Jan.-June 1974). In Blanco v. Carvacho, 72 R.DJ. 49 (2d Part, 1st Sec., Sup. Ct.,
May 20, 1975), the Supreme Court required monetarily corrected restitution of the portion of the
purchase price already paid upon annulment of a sales contract. The Court considered adherence
to the nominalist principle tenable only when there is an express legal provision requiring payment or repayment in an equal number of currency units, such as C6DIGO CIVIL art. 2199
(Chile). Article 2199 which is generally considered to be the source of the nominalist principle in
the Chilean Civil Code, has been explicitly revoked by Decree-Law No. 455 of May 25, 1974
(Chile). Recent doctrinal writing has taken the position that damages stemming from monetary
depreciation after breach of contract are compensable under Chilean law. Alvarez Nufiez, supra;
Gesche Mbller, supra note 27, at 7; Santa Maria, Indemnizaciones de PcrjuiciosyDtsvalorizacidnde la
Moneda, 67 R.DJ. 149 (1st Part. No. 8, 1970).
122. Gerlado Vieira Gonzaga da Silva v. Regina Maria Gonzaga Rammelt et al., 7
Jurisprud~ncia Brasileira LJuris. Bras.], Correrio Monetiria 217 (TJRJ 4/22/76); Associaqlo
dos Servidores Civih do Brasil v. Marilla Ruth Martins Guerra, 7 Juris. Bras., Correqio
Monet.ria 259 (TJRS 8/5/75); Jose Roberto Aufiero v. Regina Fabbro Aufiero, 7 Juris. Bras.,
Correcio Monetria 274 (TACSP 11/5/75).
123. R.E. 83.646 of the Sup. Trib. Fed., 2d Term, cited in Wald, A Corrqcio Moneidria na
juirprudindiado Supremno Tribunal Federal, at note 29, (forthcoming). The Brazilian Association of
Magistrates, in conjunction with the Study Commission of the International Union of
Magistrates, has recently taken the position that pecuniary obligations should also be subject to
monetary correction if they remain unpaid. See Araujo Lima, A CorrecoMonetdria Vista pela Unio
Internacionaldos Magistrados, 258 Rev. For. 431, 433 (1977).
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prevent injustice and to permit these institutions to continue to function as
normally as possible. In Uruguay, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme
Court, remained impervious to the problem created by inflation, finally forcing the legislature to intervene with valoristic solutions. The continued functioning of credit and financial markets has required abandonment of the
nominalist perception of interest for both usury and tax purposes. And the
continued functioning of medium and long-term credit transactions, as well
other types of contracts involving deferred performance, has required acceptance and institutionalization of indexation.
Indexation plainly is not a panacea for all of the distortions caused by inflation to the credit and financial markets. It is difficult for many companies and
individuals to live with credit costs that can be determined only expostfacto. It
is also difficult for many borrowers to be sure that their incomes will keep pace
with the rate of monetary correction on their indexed obligations. Especially in
the short-run, one effect of indexation may be to raise the effective cost of
credit to borrowers. Comprehensive indexation places enormous pressure on
the integrity of the index. When billions of dollars turn on a single index point,
there is a significant danger that index makers will be placed under severe
political pressure to shade their reporting. In Brazil the government has interfered more or less overtly with the calculation of the index used for
monetary correction and has insisted that all indexation conform to that single
index. In such circumstances, the integrity of the indexation process becomes
quite suspect.
As long as countries.are experiencing chronic inflation, there are decided
advantages to indexation. Without indexation, it is virtually impossible for
banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, and other types of
financial intermediaries to function efficiently with inflation. Moreover, indexation helps promote social justice and saving by permitting the small saver
the opportunity to protect his capital from inflationary erosion and enjoy a real
rate of return.

Preservation of effective compensation for tort and contract damages under
inflationary conditions is also exceedingly difficult without some form of indexation. Where periodical pensions are used to compensate tort plaintiffs for
lost earnings or future medical expenses, indexation of the award, or funding
it via indexed securities, as is done in Brazil, makes eminent sense. In countries where lump sum awards are used, such as Argentina, the availability of
indexed government bonds permits the plaintiff the option of investing the
award with both safety and protection from inflation. In this circumstance, the
plaintiff is overcompensated, for Argentina does not require that the award be
discounted to present value. In countries such as the United States the option
of investing in an indexed government security is sorely needed. Discounting
a tort award to present value without such an option being readily available
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can produce considerable unfairness to tort plaintiffs even at relatively mild
rates of inflation.1

24

Legal interest rates should be indexed for inflation, or the amount of
damages plus interest should be monetarily corrected to prevent the onus of
monetary depreciation from falling on the shoulders of an involuntary
creditor. Perhaps the simplest approach would be to set the legal interest rate
so that it is consistently positive by four or five percent per year. This means
the legal interest rate would consist of variations in a general price index plus
four or five percent. If the price index increases at an annual rate of 15 percent
between the date of the tort or the breach of contract and effective payment,
the plaintiff should be entitled to legal interest at the rate of 19 or 20 percent.
This would eliminate the present financial incentive for the defendant to delay
litigation as much as possible to take advantage of legal interest rates which are

negative in real economic terms.
Another way of accomplishing much the same result is by monetary correction of the damage award. Under this approach damages for breach of contract or tort would be calculated as of the day of the breach or tort. The principal plus interest then would be monetarily corrected for general price level
changes between that date and the date of payment. This technique is slightly
more favorable to the plaintiff in that it adjusts both the interest rate and the
principal for inflation. This monetary correction approach eliminates the
distortions generated by inflation and affords plaintiffs as complete a recovery
as they would have enjoyed in a stable economy.

The monetary correction approach, however, does not adjust for changes in
relative prices. If the price of medical care, wages, or the goods being sold rises
more rapidly than the general level of prices, the monetary correction ap-

proach will leave the plaintiff with an insufficient amount to secure integral
reparation. In this event, assessment of damages as of the date of the trial, as is
done in most civil law countries, is more advantageous to the plaintiff than the
monetary correction approach. If there is a protracted appeal, the debt of
value theory clearly provides the plaintiff with better protection than the
monetary correction approach.
However, there are decided drawbacks to an approach which requires constant judicial reassessment of damages. It is uneconomic and wasteful for busy
courts to have to revalue damages previously assessed. And, in certain circumstances, assessing contract damages as of the date of the trial or appeal
allows the plaintiff to speculate at the defendant's expense.

124. See Comment, FutureInflation, ProspectiucDamages, and the Circuit Courts, 63 VA. L. REV.
105, 125-30 (1977).

